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LIABILITIES OF ORGANIZERS, MEMBERS AND
OFFICERS OF A PRIVATE CORPORATION
IN INDIANA-II
ROBERT W. MILLER*

V
DIRECTORS AND OTHER OFFICERS

Since the corporation is not a natural person but only an association existing in the eyes of the law, it must rely upon agents
to carry on its business. As a general rule the charter of the
corporation provides what officers and agents will manage the
company's affairs, such management usually being vested in a
board of directors elected at stated intervals by the stockholders
of the company, such directors in turn appointing other officers
62
and agents.
The first question which naturally arises under this heading is
as to who are liable as corporate officers. Where there has
been no acceptance or user, either expressly or impliedly, of
the office, the person sought to be held should be excused. Hence,
it follows, that those persons who are liable must be corporate
officers at or during the time of the omission or commission of
the act relied upon as creating liability.
Having both a corporation and corporate officers, it is then
important to determine the legal relationship of the two. A
few cases have considered this question at great length, most of
the later decisions holding that a director or other corporate
officer is a trustee as regards the corporation. The truth, however, is that though the relationship is a fiduciary one, still the
analogy of trustee and cestui que trust is not exact, a distinct
legal status being created, which, in a number of ways, resembles
that of a trustee.
Conceding that corporate officers occupy a fiduciary relationship to the corporation, the extent of their liability to the corporation can next be discussed. The directors and other officers of
a corporation incur, to a large extent, the same liability, the
* See biographical note, p. 193.
62 In the absence of statute or provision in the charter to the contrary,
directors or other corporate officers need have no particular qualifications.

Although generally required to be a stockholder, there is no rule of law
which requires ownership of stock as a condition precedent to the right to

be a director or officer.
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same rules usually applying to both. 63 A rule of first importance is that the corporate officers must exercise the utmost good
faith in all transactions which involve their duties to the corporation and its property. This does not mean that the obligations
of the corporation's contracts must be personally carried out by
them, but only that good faith on their part must exist as regards
corporate transactions. Hence, where a corporate officer
diverted corporate property by pledging it to secure the payment
for
of his individual debts, he became liable to the corporation
4
such diversion on the grounds of acting with bad faith.
Directors are liable if they permit the corporate funds to be
lost or wasted by reason of their negligence and inattention to
their duties, though such losses occur without actual bad faith
on their part. What care must corporate officers exercise? The
best rule seems to be that negligence is the want of care according to the circumstances, and the circumstances are everything
in considering this question. One thing certain, however, is that
the corporate officers must be something more than mere figureheads. What is required is a reasonable degree of business
knowledge, care and diligence, under the circumstances of the
particular case.65
Having seen that corporate officers must act with good faith
and with reasonable prudence, must all their acts be for the
benefit of the corporation or may they also act for their own interests? Being officers and agents for the corporation, it would
seem that their acts must be solely for the benefit of the corporation except where there is no specific duty on the part of
such officers. In such latter case, it seems only fair that corporate officers may acquire outside interests, although the
corporation may be more or less interested. This question
arises primarily where the officer attempts to and does buy up
outstanding claims against the corporation. In such a case, it
is usually held that the officer may buy up the claim and later
63 Due to the fact that active officers receive compensation and spend
more of their time on corporate matters, their liability may be more extensive than that of the directors.
64 Crawfordsville First National Bank v. Dovetail, etc. Co. (1895), 143
Ind. 534.

65 There has been considerable conflict on this question and authorities
have held differently at different times. Some courts have held that bad
faith was necessary before any liability was incurred. Other courts have
had the rule of honest judgment. Still other views have been held, but the
rule that the corporate officer must live up to the duties of his job, such
duty to be determined by the circumstances of each case, seems much fairer.
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enforce it as against the corporation.0 6 Another place where
the question arises is where a director or other corporate officer
seeks to purchase at an execution or judicial sale. The better
view permits the corporate officers to buy in such corporate property if the price is a fair one and there is good faith exhibited
throughout the entire transactoin. In these cases, however,
there is no specific duty resting upon the corporate officers to
act for the best interests of the corporation.
Since corporate officers occupy a fiduciary capacity towards
the corporation, it follows that they are not permitted to profit,
in their individual capacity, by virtue of their position. Hence,
any profits so received by them, due to their being officers, belong to the company and an action by the company may be had
against them for such profits.6 7 This does not mean that a corporate officer cannot contract with the corporation, but does
mean that where he does so contract that certain safeguards
must be provided in order to make such contract valid. 68 Hence,
in general, we may say that a director or other corporate officer
must account to the corporation for any and all profits accruing
to him individually due to the fiduciary relationship in which he
stands to the corporation.
The cases seem to hold that directors are not liable for the acts
or omissions of other directors or agents, where such directors

have not themselves been guilty of neglect in supervising or
appointing them. But where such directors have participated
in such acts, or negligently failed to take measure to prevent
them, liability for resulting acts attaches. Directors "are not
66 There is a conflict in the decisions where the officer buys the"claim at
a discount and seeks to enforce it for full payment against the corporation.
Where the corporation was in the market itself, i. e., had set aside a special
fund to buy in such claims, etc., the better rule seems to hold that the officer
may recover only the amount he paid for such claim and can make no profit
on such transaction.
67 Where a director or other corporate officer in his dealings on behalf
of the corporation, either expressly or otherwise makes a profit not enjoyed
by the other stockholders, a duty to account arises. Tevis v. Hammersmith
(1907), 170 Ind. 286.
6 Where a director or other corporate officer contracts with the corporation, the mere fact that such person is an officer of the corporation does not
ipso facto render the contract bad, where the transaction is not unfair to
the corporation and the officer has acted in good faith. Wainwright v. P.
H. & F. M. Roots Co. (1912), 176 Ind. 682. Unless the following safeguards
are had, the contract is considered voidable: (1)
Good faith, (2) disinterested quorum, and (3) non-participation by the interested corporate
officer. New Jersey requires, in addition, the approval of the stockholders.
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insurers of the fidelity of the agents whom they have appointed,
who are not their agents, but the agents of the corporation; and
they cannot be held responsible for losses resulting from the
wrongful acts or omissions of other directors or agents, unless
the loss is a consequence of their own neglect of duty, either for
failure to supervise the business with attention, or in neglecting
to use proper care in the appointment of agents."0 9 The Supreme Court of Indiana, speaking through Justice Dowling, sums
up: "The supervision of the directors over the business of the
bank should have been such as would have enabled them at all
times to know its general financial condition, and to check or
prevent improvident or dishonest conduct by the president or
cashier. They had the means of knowing, and they were bound
to know the amount and value of the paper and securities held
by the bank. They were also bound to know the character and
habits of the men they had placed and kept in charge of the
bank as its president and cashier. There could be no excuse for
their failure to examine the books of the bank, and for their
ignorance of the manner in which the business was conducted."
A director or other corporate officer is liable to the corporation
for losses sustained by it where he acts outside the scope of his
authority. In the case where the question of ultra vires acts of
corporate officers arises, it is material that such officers should
have known that the acts in question were ultra vires or expressly forbidaen or beyond their powers. If the act is illegal
or ultra vires, liability attaches if it is reasonable to believe
that such corporate officers should have known they were exceeding their authority.
Briefly summarizing the liability of corporate officers to the
corporation we find that they owe a duty to the corporation of
managing the corporate affairs honestly and impartially for the
benefit of the corporation and stockholders. They are liable for
losses caused by wilful and intentional violation of their duties,
for negligence, ultra vires, acts, etc. They are not, however,
liable for losses happening through mere inadvertence and mistakes of fact, having acted in good faith, with prudence and in
the exercise of their honest judgment.
Having considered the liability of corporate officers as regards
the corporation, we next turn to their liability to the stockholders. A fiduciary relationship exists between the corporate officers and the stockholders as a group, but such officers cannot,
6OBriggs v. Spaulding (1891), 141 U. S. 132.
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in any sense, be considered the agents of the individual stockholders, nor does the fiduciary relationship extend to the individual stockholders. Chief Justice Shaw said: "There is no
legal privity, relation or immediate connection between the
holders of shares in a bank, in their individual capacity, on the
one side, and the directors of the bank, on the other. The
directors are not the bailees, the factors, agents, or trustees of
such individual stockholders.

70

It has been decided that an action at law, by the stockholders
against the directors, cannot be maintained for fraud, negligence,
misapplication of funds, or other wrongs resulting in injury to
the corporation. Such an action is reserved to the corporation
to whom the injury is primarily done. The mere fact that the
value of the shares are incidentally decreased does not give the
stockholder a cause of action. It is only where the corporation
refuses to sue upon due application by the stockholders that the
stockholders may sue on behalf of the corporation. But a demand where such a demand may awaken the conscience of the
corporation, is a condition precedent to the stockholder's right of
7
action. 1
The main question arising as between corporate officers and
stockholders relates to the duty of the director in purchasing
stock from the stockholder. May he treat the stockholder as a
stranger? There seems to be split of opinion on this question.
One Indiana Court held thAt directors may trade like strangers
provided they do not affirmatively act or speak wrongfully, or
intentionally conceal facts with reference to it.721 Seemingly a
better rule would be to require the directors to disclose at least
the salient facts and state his position to the corporation, the
directors and stockholders not, in truth, being absolute strangers.
The law on this point is not settled, as shown by a recent case,
where the director was also the general manager of the corporation as well, the United States Supreme Court holding that a
fiduciary relationship existed.7 3 Certainly it is fallacious to hold
that dealings should be had on the same basis as if both parties
were absolute strangers.
Having considered the liability of the corporate officers to tht
corporation and stockholders, their liability as regards third
persons and creditors logically follows. There is a conflict of
70 Smith v. Hurd, 12 Metc. (Mass.) 371.
71 Tevis v. Hammersmith (1903), 31 Ind. App. 281.
72 Tippecanoe County Comm'rs v. Reynolds (1873), 44 Ind. 509.
73 Strong v. Repide, 213 U. S. 419.
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opinion as to whether a director is a trustee for the creditors and
the better answer to this inquiry is to place insolvency as the
74
dividing line, holding directors as trustees after insolvency.
Considering the liability of corporate officers as regards contracts, as seen before, no liability attaches on a contract where
both parties understand that the contract is with the corporation. Of course, by express agreement, a director may make
himself personally liable on a corporate contract, but such is
not the usual case. On the other hand, where the. officer enters
into the contract without disclosing the fact that he is acting for
the corporation, but upon the assumption that he is acting for
himself as an individual, the other party to the contract may
elect to hold either the corporation or the officer, but not both.
But if the other party knows of the agency or should have known,
then only the corporation, is bound and not the agent. If the
contract is entered into in the name of a pretended corporation,
one nakedly assuming to be a corporation, the rule of individual
liability is applied. Hence, the status of the corporation and the
basis upon which the officer entered into the contract must be
considered in determining the liability involved.
Where a contract is entered into for the benefit of and in the
name of the corporation by the corporate officer, but such is done
in excess of his authority and without ratification by the corporation, the second party to the contract being in ignorance of
the officer's want of authority, such renders the corporate officer
personally liable either on the contract, or, in other jurisdictions
for false warranty of authority. 75 But an exception is had if
the second party to the contract is chargeable with knowledge. 76
There is a hopeless split of opinion on the point as to whether
liability results in favor of persons contracting with the corporate officers as representatives merely because the contract entered into is ultra vires.
Besides liability to third persons on contracts, a liability also
exists for tortious acts. In the field of corporations, as well as
74

City National Bank v. Goshen Woollen Mills Co. (1904), 35 Ind. App.,

562.
75

Flick v. Jordan (1920), 74 Ind. App. 314.

76Sourwine v. McRoy Clay Works (1908), 42 Ind. App. 358.

"Where
one person acting for another holds himself out as having authority to do
an act, and thereby draws another into a reciprocal engagement, he will be
liable if he acted without authority; but if such want of auhtority was
known to both parties or unknown to both parties-there being a mutual
mistake- the agent would not be liable." This is applicable to corporations. Newman v. Sylvester (1873), 42 Ind. 106.
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in any other field, a man is personally liable for all torts committed by him. Hence, corporate officers are liable to third
persons for injuries inflicted, regardless of whether the act was
done on his own account or on behalf of the corporation, ratification of the tort by the corporation in no wise affecting this personal liability. 77 In the absence of a statute to the contrary,
this liability of corporate officers is generally imposed only in
the cases of misfeasance or malfeasance, a split of opinion being
had on the question of nonfeasance, the majority courts excusing
such officer from liability78
The typical case in which the tort liability of an officer is involved is had in the case of fradulent acts and representations to
persons who are injured thereby. Such officer is personally
liable for damages caused by this fraud and deceit to the person
so injured. Likewise, where there is an appropriation of the
corporate property, conversion of its assets, or a negligent and
bad faith declaration and payment of dividends out of capital,
etc., a cause of action, sounding in tort, may be had against such
corporate officers. 79 A direct action may be brought by such
third persons against the officer or officers where the cause of
action is personal. Where the injury, however, is to the corporation primarily, so long as the corporation is solvent the creditors have no right to enforce corporate claims. After insolvency, however, and on refusal of the corporation to act, creditors may sue in the right of, and on the behalf of, the corporation
to enforce its cause of action against officers or directors who
are liable to it.80
77 Farmers'Mutual Fire Ins. Ass'n. v. Stewart (1906), 167 Ind. 544, and
Wright v. Barnard (1917), 248 Fed. 756. An officer or director of a cor-

poration is not liable for its torts where no participation, knowledge or consent on his part has been had in the transaction. The converse of this is
also true. Hartzler v. Goshen Churn Co. (1913), 55 Ind. App. 455. Participation in the tort is essential, unless there be consent or authorization, in
order to hold an officer liable for the torts of other officers. Folwell p.
Miller (1906), 145 Fed. 495.
78 Majority view-Baltimore Nat'l Bank Exch. v. Peters (1890), 44 Fed.
13.

Minority view-Va.-Carolina Chem. Co. v. Ehrick (1916),

230 Fed.

1005.

79

Munro v. Smith (1919), 259 Fed. 1; Moore v. Murchison (1915), 226
Fed. 679.
80 The question as to the rights of creditors who became such after the
transaction complained of will not be discussed in this article Fletcher's
Cyclopedia Corporations is given for reference. Other questions of procedure as to whether the creditor's remedy is in law or equity, etc., will
also not be discussed here.
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So far the liability of corporate officers has been discussed
without much reference to statutes. In a number of states
statutes have been enacted which make the directors or other
corporate officers liable for its debts where they are guilty of
certain prescribed official neglect or misconduct. Fletcher in his
Cyclopedia Corporations has roughly attempted to classify these
statutes, although an exhaustive classification is practically impossible. 81 Where the Legislature has acted by way of statute
in imposing liability upon directors and other officers for corporate debts, such statutes may be construed as being penal in
character.8 2 It is sufficient to say that where a statute imposes
a certain duty upon a director or officer, and prescribes a penalty
for its non-performance, such duty as laid down is the test of
both the liability and standard of conduct imposed and required.
In addition to civil liability being imposed, there is nothing to
prohibit a corporate officer from being criminally liable for his
acts; the fact that his act being an official one not constituting a
defense.8 3 Hence, where an officer conspires with other officers
to convert corporate funds to their own use, an action of embezzlement might be had against them. Indiana, for example, imposes a criminal liability on officers wilfully failing or refusing
to make reports.8 4 As a general rule, criminal liability is a
statutory matter, hence an examination of the statutes of the
81 (a) Statutes creating liability where statutory conditions precedent
to the right to do business have not been complied with or where all of a
certain part of the stock has not been subscribed for or paid in. Brown v.
Clow (1901), 158 Ind. 403. (b) Statutes providing that the violation of
any of the provisions of the incorporating acti or of certain preceding sections act, shall make directors or other officers personally liable. Burns'
Statutes (1926), Sec. 5522, as regards Manufacturing and Mining Companies. (c) Statutes making officers liable to creditors, or creditors and
others, 'for negligence or other breach of duty. (d) Statutes creating a
personal liability where the debts exceed a certain amount. Schofield v.
Henderson (1879), 67 Ind. 258. (e) Statutes making directors and others
personally liable for failure to file annual reports. (g) Statutes making
corporate officers personally liable for false reports, certificates, statements,

notices or the like.

82 Statutes creating personal liability of officers of a corporation are
generally held to be penal in character, although not such in the strict sensp
of the term-Brown v. Clow (1901), 158 Ind. 403; and are to be strictly
construed, Raber v. Jones (1872), 40 Ind. 436.
83 State v. Cooley, 141 Tenn. 33.
84 State v. CoX (1882), 88 Ind. 254.
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various states would be necessary to make an exhaustive study
of acts for which criminal liability is imposed.
The attempt made in this article has been to enumerate a few
of the many duties and liabilities imposed upon the organizers,
members and officers of private corporations with special reference to the Indiana statutes and decisions. Certainly a new
corporation act can do much to reform this field of our law.
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